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CHAPTER

I

♦

From Helplessness to Hope:
The Seminal Career of Martin Seligman
Steven F. Maier, Christopher Peterson, and Barry Schwartz

explores a specific field of psychological research, but
it also celebrates the profound contributions to this field of
Martin E. P. Seligman. Therefore, the book blends the history
of this research enterprise and Seligman’s own intellectual history. This
chapter reviews the modest origins of the phenomenon of “learned
helplessness” in the animal laboratory, its extensions to human beings
(especially those displaying dramatic failures of adaptation), and its even
tual emergence as “learned optimism.” The remainder of the book doc
uments two major themes. First, the insights arising out of research on
learned helplessness have been extended to almost every domain of
modern psychology. And second, Seligman has played a significant role
in almost all of these extensions. In fact, this book makes a fitting trib
ute to the man whose fingerprints appear on every chapter.
Although the research discussed in this book focuses on optimism
and hope, the research story does not begin there. Rather, it begins with
the opposite end of the pole—helplessness. As will become apparent,
Seligman is now a strong proponent of the development of a positive
psychology, but the historic, intellectual seeds of the view that underhes this new emphasis are very much in negative psychology. The crit
ical first step in thinking that made this development possible was an
appreciation of the negative consequences of the inability to control
important environmental events. It is this inability that produces the
learned helplessness phenomenon.
his book
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The history of research on learned helplessness and learned optimism
as well as Sehgman s own involvement in these areas reflects a large ele
ment of chance. Furthermore, the development of research in this area
also illustrates two other important lessons in how science actually pro
ceeds. First, it is often difficult to predict at the outset where research
will lead. Work on learned helplessness began in the animal laboratory
and for several years was directed at deep theoretical issues in the psy
chology of learning and not at depression, academic achievement, and
other significant human phenomena. And second, the history of learned
helplessness research demonstrates the continuity between basic and
applied research in the way that it has moved effortlessly between fun
damental issues in learning, cognition, and motivation on the one hand,
and attempts to deal with problems of human adaptation and obstacles
to the achievement of human potential on the other.

LEARNED HELPLESSNESS IN ANIMALS

Early Experiments
Learned helplessness research, and Seligman’s own work, began in the
mid-1960s in the animal learning laboratory of Richard L. Solomon at
the University of Pennsylvania. At that time, the focus in the Solomon
laboratory was on the rigorous testing of a new theory designed to
explain the occurrence of avoidance learning. In avoidance learning,
some warning signal (e.g., a light) precedes the onset of an aversive
stimulus (e.g., a shock) by a short period of time (e.g., ten seconds). A
response by the animal (e.g., jumping a hurdle) after the aversive event
has started enables it to escape the aversive stimulus. And a response
during the warning signal enables it to avoid the aversive event.
Animals readily learn to make avoidance responses in such experi
ments, and this fact created a significant theoretical puzzle. According
to the dominant theories of the day, for a response to be learned, some
event had to occur that reinforced it. The reinforcer for escape responses
was obvious—termination of shock. But what was the reinforcer for
avoidance responses? This also seems obvious—the absence of shock.
But not so fast. If the absence of shock is a reinforcer, then why doesn’t
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it reinforce everything an animal does? After aU, before the experiment,
the animal went through its life seeking food, grooming, sleeping,
exploring, and each of these behaviors was accompanied by the absence
of shock. While this sort of account is clearly absurd, it demonstrates
why calling the absence of shock a reinforcer is problematic. If the
absence of shock constitutes a reinforcer in the avoidance experiment,
it must be because the shock is otherwise expected. This account makes
obvious sense. The animal expects something (shock) to happen if it
doesn’t respond. So it responds, thereby preventing the “expected”
event. It is thus the absence of this expected aversive event that is the
reinforcer of avoidance.
For researchers and theorists of the day, dominated as they were by
the principles of behaviorism, the problem with this account was that
a major aim of their enterprise was to explain behavior without having
to appeal to mental entities like “expectations.” Solomon and his stu
dents typified this enterprise and developed a theory—two-process the
ory—to do that job for avoidance learning. The theory argued that fear
becomes classically conditioned (Process i) to the warning signal on
the early trials before the animal has learned to jump the hurdle. The
warning signal and the shock are paired together in Pavlovian fashion
on those trials. Avoidance responses do not occur until later trials, and
when they do, they escape the fear-provoking warning signal (Process 2)
and are followed by a rapid reduction in conditioned fear. The theory
thus maintained that the animal does not really learn to “avoid” the
aversive event. Rather, the so-called “avoidance” response is really an
escape response; the animal, motivated by conditioned fear produced by
the warning signal, escapes this fear.
Solomon and his students attempted to test this explanation of avoid
ance learning with what was called a “transfer of control” experiment,
in which the intention was to conduct straightforward classical condi
tioning of fear by pairing a neutral stimulus (e.g., a light) with an aver
sive stimulus. Then, in a different environment, avoidance learning
would be conducted using some other stimulus (e.g., a tone) as the
warning signal. After the avoidance response was weU established and
the animal was responding reliably to the tone, the crucial third phase
of the experiment would be conducted. The light would be turned on
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during the avoidance procedure, and the question was whether the ani
mal would now perform the avoidance response, even though the light
had never been used as a warning signal in the avoidance apparatus.
This was a key prediction made by two-process theory: If “avoid
ance” responding was really “escape” from a fear-provoking warning
signal, then any time you presented such a signal, it ought to trigger the
already learned avoidance response. However, when Leaf and Overmier, graduate students in the Solomon laboratory, set out to test the
prediction, they had difficulty in conducting the experiment. The prob
lem was that when, after classical conditioning of fear had been estab
lished, the animals were exposed to an avoidance procedure, they often
failed to learn to avoid shock. Indeed, they often failed even to learn to
escape shock (Overmier, 1968; Overmier and Leaf, 1965). This was quite
surprising given that such tasks are typically learned rapidly.
Because having learned to avoid shock was a precondition for test
ing this key prediction, the prediction could not be tested. The solution
to the problem, as it turned out, was to reverse phases i and 2 and con
duct the avoidance training first and the classical conditioning second.
This was indeed done, and the testing of two-process theory proceeded
successfully. It seemed that somehow the prior occurrence of classical
conditioning interfered with the learning of the instrumental escape
and avoidance responses.
For researchers committed to rigorous testing of two-process the
ory, this peculiar, accidentally discovered order effect was largely a
methodological nuisance. However, another graduate student in the
Solomon laboratory (Seligman), and a graduate student in Henry Gleitman’s laboratory, which was right next door (Maier), thought that the
“nuisance” deserved study in its own right and might even be more
interesting than the theory that was being tested. The question was
what was it about the shock animals received during classical condi
tioning that interfered with subsequent learning?
It is the very defining feature of classical conditioning that the behav
ior of the subject has no impact on the occurrence of the uncondi
tioned stimulus (the UCS) or its properties. Could this have been
important? This question led to what is arguably the single most impor
tant experiment in the entire literature concerning helplessness and
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optimism. Overmier and Seligman (1967) first gave animals a series of
either escapable shocks—shocks that could be terminated by a
response—or exacdy matched but inescapable shocks, as in classical con
ditioning. The animals were later tested for escape and avoidance learn
ing in a different apparatus. It turned out that the animals that had
initially received escapable shock learned normally, while those that had
initially received physically identical inescapable shocks failed to learn.
This demonstration was quickly followed by experiments in which it
was found that an experience of escapable shock “immunized” animals
so that a later exposure to inescapable shock was without effect on later
learning (Seligman and Maier, 1967), and ideas about control, helpless
ness, and optimism were born.

Learned Helplessness Theory
Why should inescapable shock interfere with later learning? The process
of attempting to answer this question became a crossroads for Seligman
and Maier. Explanatory concepts existed within the behaviorist theo
ries that dominated the 1960s that could provide an “explanation” (e.g.,
BraceweU and Black, 1974). However, the explanation seemed contorted
and inelegant, and seemed to trivialize the phenomenon. If one added
to this a growing disenchantment with the pinched behaviorist theo
ries of the time, as well as two personalities who wanted to “push the
envelope,” it was over-determined that a new theory would be devel
oped.
Sehgman and Maier reasoned that it must be something about what
the animal learned about inescapable shock that was critical, rather than
the shock per se, because inescapable and escapable shocks were phys
ically identical, yet had drastically different effects. What could the ani
mals be learning? Sehgman and Maier together pondered this seemingly
easy-to-answer question for months, consulted scholars in various dis
ciplines, and could not come up with a meaningful answer within the
context of learning theory. Presumably, the key was that the shock was
inescapable. But what did that really mean? How can that fact about
shock be learned? This question obviously does not seem difficult now,
and probably would not have seemed all that difficult back then, to
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someone not fortunate enough to have been immersed in the learning
theories of the day. However, Seligman and Maier were immersed in
those theories. And those theories emphasized what might be called
“magic moments” of temporal conjunction of conditioned stimulus
and unconditioned stimulus, response and reinforcer. The language of
“control” and “lack of control” that seems so natural today was com
pletely absent in the 1960s and early 1970s. An organism could never
learn about lack of control if it were locked into processing the world
as a series of these magic moments.
Influenced by some revolutionary experiments and ideas coming
from another lab mate (e.g., Rescorla, 1967), Sehgman and Maier ulti
mately reasoned that the animal must be learning that responding and
shock termination are independent. This required that organisms be sen
sitive to the probability of an outcome (e.g., shock termination) given
that they had made some response, to the probability of the outcome
given that they had not made that response, and to the relation between
these two probabilities. Act and outcome were independent when these
two probabilities were equal, and Seligman and Maier argued that this
is what the animal learns about inescapable shock—that shock termi
nation is independent of voluntary responses.
It was not long before Seligman and Maier realized that the com
parison of these two probabilities defined a dimension that could be
called “behavioral control over environmental events.” Learning about
this dimension—the “computing” of probabilities—is quite far removed
from the “magic moments” of earlier theories. However, this still did
not explain why animals exposed to inescapable shock later fail to learn
to escape. Seligman and Maier argued that the learning that shock ter
mination is independent of behavior has two major consequences. First,
this learning interferes with the subsequent formation of associations
between the escape response and shock termination. Second, this learn
ing undermines the motivation to attempt to escape. This entire set of
conjectures was first published in a chapter by Maier, Seligman, and
Solomon (1969) and was collectively called the learned helplessness
hypothesis.
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Research from 19^0—1985
Animal research on learned helplessness in the next 10—15 years went in
two different directions. The first one focused on the behavioral phe
nomenon itself and revolved around its generality and limits. Was the
interference with escape learning produced by inescapable shock
restricted to escaping shock, or would the organism also fail to escape
other aversive events? Would an inescapable event other than electric
shock produce the same phenomenon? Did uncontrollable aversive
events affect aspects of behavior other than escape learning? Did uncon
trollable positive events produce analogous outcomes? How long did
the effects persist? What was the range of species that showed helpless
ness phenomena? Could helplessness be demonstrated in humans?
Questions such as these were addressed by a growing number of inves
tigators, and answers to these questions indicated that the phenomenon
was quite robust and general (see Maier and Sehgman, 1976).
The second direction concentrated on theory testing. The learned
helplessness theory initially not only met with great resistance but also
generated quite a controversy. This should be no surprise since the
assumptions about the nature of the learning process made by the the
ory were opposed to the ideas that were then dominant. In addition to
criticizing the ideas involved in the theory of learned helplessness, oppo
nents suggested alternative explanations of the basic interference with
escape learning produced by inescapable shock. There were two cate
gories of alternative theories. One category was behavioral. As a class,
these theories argued that exposure to inescapable shock taught organ
isms some response that interfered with the one they were later required
to learn. The second category was neurochemical, derived from some
pioneering work by Weiss (Weiss, 1968; Weiss, Stone, & Harrell, 1970).
These theories argued that inescapable shock depleted a neurotransmitter, typically norepinephrine, that was necessary for the mediation of
movement. Therefore, helplessness was not the result of an interference
with learning per se, but rather it was the result of neurochemically
based movement impairment. What the behavioral and neurochemical
accounts have in common is an appeal to peripheral (movement based)
rather than central (learning based) mechanisms to explain interference.
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The idea that the learned helplessness phenomenon could be
explained by the learning of interfering motor responses was relatively
easy to disprove (Maier, 1970). However, the neurochemical depletion
and movement deficit ideas were more challenging. It became clear that
animals that had been exposed to uncontrollable aversive events did later
move less in the presence of aversive events than did other animals.
However, this could be explained readily by both theories. Reduced
motivation to escape consequent to learning uncontrollability, as well as
depletion of transmitters required for movement, would predict reduced
movement.
The difference between the views thus came to be focused on
whether or not there was a true interference with associative processes,
as well as a reduction in movement, following exposure to uncontrol
lable aversive events. The difficulty was that the learning tasks used in
learned helplessness experiments confounded poor learning with
reduced movement. That is, all the tasks that had been used required
active motor output (e.g., jumping over the hurdle) as the index of
learning. A series of experiments attempted to resolve this issue by
assessing learning in tasks in which there was either no correlation (Jackson, Alexander, & Maier, 1980), or even a negative correlation between
learning and movement (Minor, Jackson, & Maier, 1984)- In the latter
category of study, the behavior needed to escape was the withholding of
an active motor response, and animals previously exposed to uncon
trollable stressors continued to emit this active motor response, thereby
failing to learn to escape. Here, failure to learn was reflected in greater
movement rather than reduced movement.

Synthesis
Despite this research, there still were numerous difficulties for learned
helplessness theory. First, even at the level of psychological theory,
learned helplessness was vague concerning the mechanism by which
uncontrollable stressors produce later associative interference. Exactly
what was interfered with? Second, despite the existence of a true asso
ciative interference, movement per se was nevertheless often still
reduced. Third, learned helplessness theory had no satisfactory expla-
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nation for many of the behavioral effects of uncontrollable stressors that
occurred in addition to interference with escape learning. Why should
uncontrollable stressors reduce aggressiveness, interfere with maternal
behavior, exaggerate fear conditioning, reduce food and water intake,
and increase responsiveness to opiate drugs such as morphine? The Ust
of consequences of uncontrollable stressors is long, and reduced incen
tive to escape and associative interference can not explain all, or even
most of them.
Purely behavioral research continues to make progress on the nature
of the alterations in associative processes that are produced by exposure
to uncontrollable stressors. The bulk of the evidence suggests that expo
sure to uncontrollable stressors produces an attentional shift away from
“internal,” response-produced cues and toward external cues (Lee &
Maier, 1988). This might suggest that uncontrollable stressors produce a
change in learning style, not a deficit per se. Indeed, it might be
expected that uncontrollably stressed organisms would learn better than
normals in tasks requiring detailed attention to external cues, and this
is actually the case (Lee & Maier, 1988).
However, purely behavioral research has not been able to provide
much insight into how uncontrollable stressors alter other types of
behavior. Here, neuroscience and neurochemistry have been able to
provide great advances. A number of investigators have elucidated the
neural and neurochemical consequences of uncontrollability in fine
detail (e.g., Anisman, Zalcman, Shanks, & Kacharko, 1991; Maswood,
Barter, Watkins, & Maier, 1998; Petty, Kramer, & Moeller, 1994; Simson
& Weiss, 1988). The tremendous explosion of knowledge concerning
how the brain works and how it regulates behavior has made it possi
ble to tie the neurochemical consequences of uncontroUability to the
behavioral consequences that occur. It is now possible, for example, to
state why uncontrollable stressors reduce aggressiveness rather than
increase it, why they increase fear, and so on. Indeed, a knowledge of the
underlying neurocircuitry has allowed a priori prediction of new, unex
plored consequences of uncontroUability. For example, from what is
known about neurocircuitry, one can make the counter-intuitive pre
diction that uncontroUably stressed animals wiU find opiate drugs, but
not stimulants, more rewarding and addictive than normal animals (WiU,
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Watkins, and Maier, 1998). Such a prediction would be unlikely based
on purely behavioral knowledge.

Future Directions
The powerful techniques now available to researchers in the neuro
sciences, added to rapidly accumulating detailed knowledge, suggest that
animal research in the foreseeable future will be focused at the neurobiological level. This neurobiological emphasis is also related to the
medical need to develop animal models of pathology. Effective bio
medical research requires animal models, and the neurobiological work
on learned helplessness indicates that it may be an especially useful
model of a number of psychopathologies (e.g., Basoglu & Mineka,
1992). The fact that learned helplessness in animals has been proposed
as a model of a number of different disorders should not be disturbing.
Disorders such as depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and the like
are syndromal nosological categories, not biological entities. A given
biological phenomenon, like learned helplessness, could be common
to a number of disorders. Furthermore, it could reveal the common
core cause of a diversity of pathologies. It is a real testimony to the
power and importance of basic research and theory to realize that these
broad and exciting new directions, full of potential significance for
application, have flowed from the accidental discovery that dogs with a
certain history were unable to learn what for other dogs was a trivial
task. But it should also be clear that for progress to be made, “accidents”
like this have to happen to the right people, and Seligman is such a
person.

LEARNED HELPLESSNESS IN HUMANS

Mapping the behavioral scope of learned helplessness in animals, artic
ulating the theory, and defending it against the many challenges that
arose would have been more than enough to keep even the most ener
getic scientist busy for years—but not Seligman. For as the develop
ments just described were unfolding, Seligman was also taking the
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helplessness phenomenon in an entirely different direction, by asking
about its scope and character in human beings.
The earliest studies of human helplessness were stricdy analogous to
those done with animals, exposing human research participants to aver
sive events—typically bursts of white noise—that could neither be
escaped nor avoided. Participants were then tested on tasks that could be
mastered, for example, unscrambling anagrams. And just as with ani
mals, the reliable finding was that relative to individuals who either had
no previous experimental experience, or experience with controllable
events, those who had experienced uncontrollability often showed
deficits, including negative affect, slower problem-solving, more failures
to master tasks, and perseveration with unproductive strategies.
One of the most widely cited papers from this early era of human
helplessness research was by Seligman and Hiroto (Hiroto & Seligman,
1975), which reported four parallel studies testing the transfer of help
lessness deficits from one sort of pretreatment to a second sort of test
task. Two pretreatment tasks were used, an “instrumental” pretreatment,
in which participants had to press buttons to terminate a noise, and a
“cognitive” pretreatment, in which participants had to solve conceptidentification problems. Two test tasks were used, one “instrumental”
(moving a lever to escape or avoid a noise) and the other “cognitive”
(unscrambling anagrams). The four studies were made up of all possi
ble combinations of the pretreatments and test tasks.
It was hardly surprising that deficits were evident when the test tasks
were similar to the pretreatments; these results would be predicted by
almost any theory. More interesting were the findings that deficits were
also evident when the test tasks and the pretreatments were dissimilar.
Using jargon popular at the time, Hiroto and Seligman concluded that
“cross-modal helplessness” had been produced and that this was strong
support for the theory that helplessness involved learning that one did
not have control over events.
In retrospect, the distinction between “instrumental” and “cognitive”
pretreatments and test tasks may seem artificial, but it provides a useful
reminder that Hiroto and Seligman did their experiments at a time
when there was still broad skepticism in the field about the necessity or
utility of mentalistic accounts of behavior that relied on things like
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“expectations.” The cognitive revolution was still being fought, and
behaviorism had yet to surrender. The investigation of learned help
lessness, among humans as well as animals, was one of the important bat
tlegrounds.
Perhaps because helplessness theory was fighting a rear-guard action
against behaviorism, the early research in helplessness paid scant atten
tion to the detailed development of helplessness theory as an alternative.
The original helplessness story was a very simple, straightforward
account of how experience with uncontrollable events produces sub
sequent deficits. Helplessness theory argued that uncontrollable events
produce an expectation of response-outcome independence, which in
turn produces a variety of deficits, and left it at that. Introducing the
construct of “expectation” was a sufficient departure from prevailing
theory that researchers did not scrutinize this construct until some time
later. Indeed, very few early studies even tried to measure expectations,
despite the central role they were accorded in helplessness theory. Ani
mals, of course, cannot directly report on what they expect. But people
can. Yet, perhaps because helplessness theory was firmly grounded in the
animal learning tradition, the earliest investigators of human helplessness
did not turn immediately to such contemporary theoretical frames as
Rotters social learning theory (1954). Rotter (1966,1975) wrote exten
sively about generalized expectancies (such as locus of control and inter
personal trust) and provided means with which to investigate them.
Cronbach (1957) distinguished between two traditions of scientific
psychology—an experimental tradition, emphasizing external objective
events and their effects on behavior, and a correlational tradition,
emphasizing internal subjective events and their effects. Cronbach called
for the unification of these traditions, acknowledging that it would be
difficult to do so. Researchers in each tradition not only ask different
questions about behavior, but also use different research and analytical
strategies. SeUgman led other helplessness researchers to bridge the gap
described by Cronbach when he asked whether the helplessness phe
nomenon, as produced in animal and human laboratories, was similar to
certain failures of human adaptation.
The best-known of these apphcations was Seligman’s proposal that
learned helplessness played a causal role in depression (1974, I975)-
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Though animal models of psychopathology had been around at least
since the time of Pavlov, SeHgman significantly advanced such efforts by
specifying expHcitly a set of rigorous ground rules for establishing the
goodness of a laboratory model (e.g., Miller, Rosellini, & Seligman,
1977). According to Seligman, it was critical that researchers move back
and forth between the model and the clinical phenomenon, evaluating
the parallels vis-a-vis symptoms, causes, treatments, and preventions.
Even today, some researchers touting animal models of various mal
adies, psychological and physical, do not sufficiently validate their mod
els against the actual clinical phenomena they purport to clarify. A wry
comment by Judah Folkman, the laboratory researcher whose studies of
a possible new type of cancer treatment received massive pubhcity in the
spring of 1998, exemplifies this well: “We know a great deal about how
to cure cancer in mice.” In contrast, SeUgman knows a great deal about
helplessness and its consequences in dogs, rats, and human beings.

Helplessness and Attributional Style
A major turning point in the development of research and theory on
human helplessness came in 1978, when Seligman, in collaboration with
Abramson and Teasdale, published a revised theory of helplessness and
depression (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). The new theory
incorporated ideas from attribution theory, which for years had been the
private domain of social psychology. From this point forward, simple
claims about the relation among experience, expectations, and behav
ior were replaced by efforts designed to detail the processes by which
expectations were formed. The revised theory started with an attempt
to make sense of some anomalous data. As researchers investigated par
allels between learned helplessness on the one hand and failures of adap
tation like depression on the other, it became clear that problems like
depression were more complex than the helplessness theory allowed.
Sometimes human helplessness following uncontroUabdity was chronic;
other times, it was transient. Sometimes human helplessness was perva
sive; other times, it was circumscribed. And sometimes human helpless
ness was marked by a striking loss of self-esteem; other times, it was not.
The original helplessness theory was silent regarding these variations.
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Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale (1978) revised the learned help
lessness theory as it applied to people, and especially to depression, by
proposing that when individuals encounter an uncontrollable aversive
event, they ask themselves why. The answer people give to this ques
tion—the causal attribution they entertain—sets the parameters for the
helplessness that ensues. Three dimensions of causal attribution were
claimed to be important. If the attributed cause were stable (“it’s going
to last forever”) rather than unstable, then helplessness would be longlasting. If it were global (“it’s going to undermine everything”) rather
than specific, then helplessness would be general. And if the causal attri
bution were internal (“it’s me”) rather than external, then helplessness
would be accompanied by a loss of self-esteem. The pattern of causal
attributions for a particular instance of uncontroUability would affect a
person’s expectations for the future. And these expectations would in
turn affect the person’s behavior.
Reality or social consensus may sometimes dictate the causal expla
nation that a person embraces; but in more ambiguous circumstances,
the individual relies on habitual tendencies to explain bad events in a
given way, a personality characteristic described by Seligman as explana
tory (or attributional) style (Peterson & Seligman, 1984). Those people
who tend to offer stable and global explanations for bad events are not
only at risk for helplessness, but also for the failures of adaptation in
which helplessness figures in the wake of uncontroUability. Those peo
ple who tend to offer internal explanations for bad events are at risk for
self-esteem loss in the wake of uncontroUability.
This revised account of learned helplessness—the attributional refor
mulation—is an explanation of human problems that presupposes that
people are rational, acting “logicaUy” in accordance with their inter
pretation of the causes of events. The rationality inherent in the
processes proposed by the attributional reformulation of helplessness
theory may be what aUows it to be used in the service of a positive psy
chology. For this rationality can explain resiUence as readily as helpless
ness, hope as weU as despair, and good cheer as weU as depression. It teUs
us how to intervene to undo passivity as weU as how to prevent passivity
in the first place. In aU cases, how a person thinks about the things he or
she experiences is taken seriously. At the same time, it is important to
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stress that one of the potent determinants of explanatory style is reahty,
so that interventions cannot be so simple as just urging people to “think
positive” when the world in which they hve is relentlessly negative.
The attribution reformulation of helplessness theory is a diathesisstress theory, proposing that the conjunction of objective bad events
(the stress) and a pessimistic explanatory style (the diathesis) is necessary
for negative behavioral outcomes to ensue. This position builds from the
roots of the helplessness approach in the experimental psychology of
animal learning, where bad events—the stress (e.g., uncontrollable elec
tric shocks)—are presented to research participants. When guiding
research with people, the attributional reformulation has usually focused
on the cognitive diathesis, which proves a consistent correlate of
expected outcomes.
When one of us (Peterson) originally went to the University of
Pennsylvania in 1979 to work with Seligman, Sehgman supervised both
a thriving animal laboratory and a thriving human laboratory. The attri
butional reformulation of helplessness theory had just been proposed,
an Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ) to measure attributional
style had been created, and the initial investigation of explanatory style
had just been published (Seligman, Abramson, Semmel, & von Baeyer,
1979). Over the years, explanatory style research has become increasingly
popular, and many ways to measure this individual difference variable
are now available. The original Attributional Style Questionnaire (Peter
son, Semmel, von Baeyer, Abramson, Metalsky, & Sehgman, 1982) was
expanded, to boost reliability (Peterson &ViUanova, 1988), and then
simphfied (Dykema, Bergbower, Doctora, & Peterson, 1996), to facili
tate use with general population samples. A Children’s ASQ with a
forced choice format was developed by Kaslow and Tanenbaum (Sehg
man, Peterson, Kaslow, Tanenbaum, Alloy, & Abramson, 1984) and then
refined (Thompson, Kaslow, Weiss, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). Forcedchoice measures suitable for use with adults are in the process of being
created (Reivich, 1995). A content analysis strategy dubbed the CAVE
technique (Content Analysis ofVerbatim Explanations) was created that
allowed pre-existing written or spoken material to be scored for explana
tory style (Peterson, Schulman, CasteUon, & Sehgman, 1992). StiU other
strategies have been reported, including ways to score Minnesota
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Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) responses (Colligan, OfFord,
Malinchoc, Schulman, & Seligman, 1994) and Thematic Apperception
Test (TAT) protocols (Peterson & Ulrey, 1994) for explanatory style.
In their monograph Learned Helplessness: A Theory for the Age of Per
sonal Control, Peterson, Maier, and Seligman (1993) took a step back
from the details of current helplessness research and tried to account for
its popularity. One of the reasons they cited was the availability of rel
atively simple and straightforward methods for conducting helplessness
research. The family of explanatory style measures just described exem
plifies this point. Countless researchers have used one or another of
these approaches to investigate the correlates of pessimistic versus opti
mistic explanatory style. Some of this work has been theory-driven, for
example, the several hundred investigations of explanatory style and
depression (Sweeney, Anderson, & Bailey, 1986). But other studies have
been exploratory and opportunistic, such as Petersons investigations of
explanatory style as a risk factor for traumatic injuries (see Chapter 8).
In any case, explanatory style has emerged from its connection to help
lessness as a personahty characteristic in its own right, one that is broadly
associated with coping, adaptation, and well-being (Buchanan & SeHgman, 1995).
Important questions about explanatory style remain, of course (Peter
son, 1991). For example, what are the origins of explanatory style, espe
cially its pessimistic manifestation? One can readily explain why a
pessimistic style maintains itself, because of the vicious cycles it can set
into motion, but why would anyone start out with this view of the
causes of events? Here research has only begun to scratch the surface,
but there are hints that the explanatory styles of parents and children
converge (Seligman et al., 1984). Also, failure and trauma early in life
seem to foreshadow pessimism later in hfe (Peterson, Maier, & SeHgman,
1993). Finally, in a study of twins, Schulman, Keith, and Sehgman (1993)
reported that explanatory style was moderately heritable. We should
probably not interpret this to mean that there is a specific causal attri
bution gene waiting to be discovered. However, some of the factors
that lead to success or failure in life—intelligence, attractiveness,
health, physical prowess, and the Hke—are indisputably heritable, and the
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experiences that they enable or block may well shape the individuals
explanatory style.
Perhaps more important, especially for a future positive psychology
of optimism and hope, is the question of how an optimistic explanatory
style can be encouraged. Intervention studies by Seligman’s research
group demonstrate that children can be taught with cognitive-behav
ioral exercises to look at events in a more optimistic fashion, and that
this instruction seems to have long-term benefits (see Chapter ii). And
Beck’s cognitive therapy for depression has the effect of making pes
simistic individuals more optimistic; changes in explanatory style seem
to go in lock-step with symptom relief and may confer protection
against the recurrence of depression (Seligman, Castellon, Cacciola,
Schulman, Luborsky OUove, & Downing, 1988).
As the multiple available measures of explanatory style facilitate rapid
progress, the downside of these measures could be premature preoccu
pation with the particular constellation of attributional dimensions
hypothesized by Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale in their reformula
tion of helplessness theory. To be sure, the internality, stability, and globality of causal attributions are important, but they are hardly the only
attributional dimensions of potential interest (Weiner, 1986). There is no
doubt that whether events are inside the skin or outside (internahty),
whether they persist across time or not (stability), and whether they
generalize across situations or not (globality) are key dimensions of the
psychological universe. But the universe must have more key dimen
sions than this. What are they?
For example, what about the controllability of events? One might
think that perceived controllability should have been included as an
additional dimension measured by the ASQ and its descendants, but
the reformulation of helplessness theory—inspired as it was by data
from controlled laboratory experiments—took it for granted that the
controllabdity or uncontroUabiHty of events was objectively known, and
not a part of experience open to interpretation and sensitive to indi
vidual differences. As the revised theory is increasingly applied outside
the laboratory, this neglect of controllability as a possible dimension of
explanatory style becomes more and more unfortunate. For example.
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studies suggest that ostensible “pessimism” (internal, stable, and global
causal explanations) concerning bad events seen as controllable may
have desirable consequences (Sellers & Peterson, 1993), perhaps because
they constitute an assertion that things can be different.
Similarly, what about the importance (e.g., magnitude or severity) of
the events about which attributions are made? Again, the reformulation
did not consider this parameter because in laboratory experiments the
aversive events to which research participants were exposed were held
constant. The earliest version of the ASQ did ask respondents to rate the
importance of the hypothetical events that were presented, but these rat
ings rarely proved interesting, perhaps because they did not span a broad
enough range of possible importance.
This neglect of the importance of events in helplessness theory has
recently been rectified. In their hopelessness theory of depression,
Abramson, Metalsky, and Alloy (1989) made the importance of events
a cornerstone in what has become the next major reformulation of
helplessness theory. Stoplights and pollen counts are uncontrollable and
aversive, but it is doubtful that depression is ever precipitated by these
events, no matter how they are interpreted. They are simply not impor
tant enough.
Along similar lines, the original ASQ dehberately included achieve
ment-related and interpersonal types of events, under the assumption
that explanatory style might show some domain specificity. Again, this
distinction rarely proved interesting, largely because respondents treated
these different sorts of events as very similar. But perhaps young adult
college students in the United States, the typical participants in the ear
liest studies of explanatory style, are likely to conflate achievement and
interpersonal outcomes. Good grades and high salaries can boost one s
social status, turning achievement into something social. And interper
sonal success can be reflected by how many best friends one has, turn
ing social circumstances into opportunities for achievement. As the
attributional reformulation of helplessness is extended into other set
tings—other age groups, other socioeconomic classes, and other cul
tures—it would be wise to revisit the possibility that there are
domain-specific explanatory styles. It is already clear, for example, that
the internal versus external distinction can prove problematic when
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assessed in collectivist cultures, where the distinction between self (inter
nal) and others (external) is not given the same significance that it has
in the contemporary United States (cf. MiUer, 1984).
One of the interesting extensions of the attributional reformulation
targets these other populations. The ASQ has been translated into a
variety of languages, and investigators have begun to explore explana
tory style in other cultures. To date, results are largely consistent with the
findings from the United States. A pessimistic explanatory style has
undesirable correlates, whereas an optimistic explanatory style has desir
able ones. But this research has been oriented toward confirmation, and
the possibility that the ASQ (and of course the accompanying attribu
tional reformulation of helplessness) needs to be made more culturally
appropriate has yet to be considered seriously. We anticipate that an
exciting chapter in the learned helplessness tradition will be written
when such cross-cultural investigations are begun in earnest.
What about the role of objective events? As psychologists in the
learned helplessness tradition poise themselves to help develop a posi
tive social science (Seligman, 1998), it is crucial that the role of reality
be remembered. From the uncontrollable events that predispose people
to helplessness to the actual causal texture of the world that (sometimes)
dictates a particular type of causal attribution, the outcomes of interest
to “positive” social scientists are as much influenced by what the situa
tion does or does not afford as they are by attitudes of hope and opti
mism. One would not want to stroll into Lebanon, Northern Ireland,
the former Yugoslavia, or West Philadelphia and advise their residents
simply to be more optimistic in their outlooks. A positive social sci
ence needs to encourage appropriate changes in social conditions so
that optimism can exist as a viable worldview.

CONCLUSION

This chapter tried to accomplish two things: provide a brief history, as
background for the compelling contributions to this book, and estab
lish a sense of the magnitude of Martin Seligman s contributions to
date. It is true that much about helplessness and optimism still needs to
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be explored. Helplessness and its consequences are not as simple as peo
ple once thought, and many details need to be worked out. Many big
questions remain to be answered, and some big questions have yet to be
asked. Nevertheless, what is already notable about the research spawned
by learned helplessness, especially Seligman’s contributions to that
research, is that they constitute a rare example of what Cronbach envi
sioned forty years ago.
We suggest an informative exercise: Access PsycINFO or PsycLIT,
and enter “au=Seligman, Martin E. P.” Your first thought may be “Oh,
the E. P. stands for “ever publishing,” but the sheer number of articles
that Seligman has had a hand in is not the point. Rather, look at the
range ofjournals in which Seligman and his colleagues have published
studies of learned helplessness, from Journal of Comparative and Physio
logical Psychology to Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, from
Journal of Experimental Psychology to Journal of Personality and Social Psy
chology, from Behaviour Research and Therapy to Cognitive Therapy and
Research, from American Psychologist to Journal of Abnormal Psychology,
from Psychology Today to Science. With Seligman taking the lead, the
phenomenon of learned helplessness has produced research as broad in
scope as is psychology itself.
To locate Seligman further in the broad history of psychology, we
must also note that he is among the rare psychologists who has heeded
the plea George MiUer (1969) made in his American Psychological
Association Presidential speech to “give psychology away. Many seri
ous researchers are reluctant to take their ideas to the general pubhc, but
Seligman, the president of APA in 1998, has never been shy about doing
so. His popular books are as laudable as his monographs and journal
articles. They make difficult and important ideas accessible to untrained
readers without oversimplifying or pandering to current fashion. The
point is that Seligman has always had something worth giving away.
His basic research has legitimized his popular presentations. At the same
time, his writing for the general public has stimulated interest in basic
research among several generations of academic psychologists, and it
continues to do so.
Finally, as evidenced by this book and by Seligman’s other recent
contributions (e.g., Seligman, 1998), Seligman is leading his many stu-
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dents and collaborators in the next major new direction—taking the
insights gained from research on learned helplessness and putting them
to use in creating a psychology that emphasizes the nurture of what is
good rather than just the repair of what is broken. Seligman’s most
recent endeavor is a call for psychology to be as focused on strength as
weakness, as interested in building the best things in life as repairing
the worst, and as concerned with making the hves of normal people ful
filling as healing pathology. He dubs this “positive psychology,” and
although his interest in this topic stems from decades of studying what
can go wrong with the human condition, positive psychology represents
a radical reframing of Seligman s research program.
To be sure, everything learned about helplessness and its relation to
depression, failure, and illness informs our knowledge of the absence of
these conditions (Peterson, Maier, & Seligman, 1993).But there is more
to positive psychology than the study of what does not go wrong. The
“neutral” points of the typical outcome measures in the learned help
lessness research tradition signify not being depressed, not failing, and
not being iU. To extend past findings beyond these neutral points and
offer conclusions about emotional fulfillment, achievement, and well
ness, positive psychologists must study not just independent variables that
pertain to strength but also appropriate dependent variables. And differ
ent questions must be posed by positive psychologists than have been
asked by researchers who work within a disease or deficiency frame
work. Possible topics of interest to positive psychology include hope,
creativity, optimism, happiness, flow, courage, emotional intelHgence,
giftedness, genius, future-mindedness, interpersonal skills, and honesty.
In approaching these topics, positive psychologists should heed cer
tain lessons from past attempts to understand human strengths and skills.
From the fate of humanistic psychology of the 1960s and 1970s, posi
tive psychologists should learn the importance of relying on empirical
research. Humanists were skeptical about the scientific method and
what it could yield yet were unable to offer an alternative other than the
unsupported assertion that people were good. In contrast, positive psy
chologists must see both strength and weakness as authentic and as
amenable to scientific understanding.
From the fate of past studies of creativity, positive psychologists should
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learn to keep an open mind about appropriate operational definitions
of the topics of interest to them. Although self-report questionnaire
measures are often useful and valid, not everything of interest to posi
tive psychologists can be so assessed. Already we are seeing researchers
searching for questionnaire measures of emotional intelligence (Schutte
et ah, 1998),but there is good reason to suspect that these measures will
need to be supplemented if not altogether replaced by more complex
measures that rely on the observation of actual behavior (Davies,
Stankov, & Roberts, 1998).
From the fate of intelligence testing throughout the twentieth cen
tury, positive psychologists should learn several lessons as well. Desirable
psychological states should not be reified; they should not be studied out
of context; and they should not be used to rank order aU people along
a single continuum. Most importantly, positive psychologists should not
regard what is “right” about people as unalterable, the result of fortu
itous genetic or environmental circumstances. Indeed, the central goal
of positive psychology is to cultivate and encourage the good psycho
logical life for all people. That would be a legacy worthy of Martin
Seligman.
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